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This paper offers an explanation for the existence of price control on new 
houses in Korea, which is deemed both inefficient and inequitable. This 
phenomenon cannot be explained by the conventional model of rent-
seeking or the capture theory of regulation. Instead, it is attributable to the 
popular belief that the removal of the price regulation will lead to the 
increase in the overall housing price by increasing the demand for existing 
houses that are a perfect substitute for new houses. However, the paper, 
using a stock-adjustment model of the housing market, demonstrates that 
the claimed outcome cannot materialize under perfect foresight or adaptive 
expectation. The outcome is possible in the short run under a peculiar 
expectation scheme of a self-fulfilling nature.  But even in this case, the 
price increase will be a one-time event and in the long-run overall housing 









Once a regulation is introduced, it generates benefits for some segments of 
the society. This makes it very difficult to lift the regulation even after it has 
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become unnecessary or undesirable for the society as a whole. Rent-seeking 
is a typical mechanism through which interest groups lobby for the 
continuation of regulations from which they draw benefits. Uncertainty about 
the short-term consequences and the nature of transition to a new equilibrium 
can be another barrier to removing a regulation, because short-run effects 
largely determine whether deregulation will be sustainable. This paper 
addresses the role of expectation on the short-run dynamics of deregulation. 
A particular reference is made to the price control on new apartments that has 
been enforced over the past two decades in South Korea so as to make new 
housing affordable to larger numbers of homebuyers1.  
 
The price control on new apartments and other accompanying regulations 
that will be discussed below are hard to justify on the grounds of efficiency 
and equity. They are inefficient because they reduce the quantity of houses 
supplied, lower the quality of housing, make the housing supply system less 
responsive to market signals, and limit the range of housing choices for 
consumers. They are also inequitable because their main beneficiary is  the 
middle class, and not the poor. All these points are well known to housing 
experts and many policy-makers. In fact, the government began to uplift the 
price controls and accompanying regulations in 1996. In doing so, however, 
the government first removed the price control in those regions where they 
were no longer binding. Price control is still being enforced on apartments 
built on land supplied by the public sector. The main reason for this 
apparently illogical sequence of government policy moves towards the 
eventual removal of the price control is the fear that deregulation may raise 
the overall housing price (Kim and Kim 1998).  
 
Within the framework of the standard market supply-demand model, it is 
difficult to understand why lifting the price control on new housing will raise 
the prices of existing houses. Decontrol will not reduce the supply of new 
                                                 
1 One anonymous referee suggested that the persistence of the price regulation might be 
better explained using the Stiglerian capture theory (Stigler 1971). The theory views 
regulation as a capture of the policy makers by the well-organized beneficiary groups at 
the sacrifice of the ill-informed and hard-to-be-organized general public. However, it is 
not relevant in the context of the regulation discussed in this paper. The major 
beneficiary of the price control is the potential winners of the lottery, i.e. the right to 
purchase new apartments at below market prices. But they are too large in numbers to 
organize themselves as a special interest group. In fact, there is no such pressure group in 
existence. One might also suspect that some favors such as entry barriers are provided to 
the homebuilders as a compensation for the price regulation. It is true that a system of 
license does exist but it came into being long before the price regulation was introduced. 
In conclusion, the persistence of price control on new apartments in Korea cannot be 
explained by the Stiglerian theory of economic regulation. 
128  Kim and Kim 
  
houses and there is no reason to expect their demand to increase. However, 
the popular belief in Korea is that the demand for existing housing will 
increase. The reason, it is claimed, is that some consumers who have been 
waiting to purchase new houses at the controlled price will opt to buy from 
the existing stock, their perfect substitute, as decontrol eliminates the 
advantages of further waiting.  
 
We believe that the above reasoning is based upon a misinterpretation of the 
concept of substitutes. Two commodities X and Y are called substitutes if the 
demand for one commodity increases as the market price of the other rises. 
Suppose the price of commodity X is set below the unfettered equilibrium 
level. When the price control is removed, can one say that the demand for 
commodity Y will increase because the price of its substitute rises? The 
answer is no, because it is not an increase of the equilibrium price. The true 
equilibrium price remains unchanged regardless of the artificial price control. 
In fact, the equilibrium price of commodity X will fall following decontrol 
because it will increase supply. This will decrease the demand for commodity 
Y, its substitute, thereby lowering the equilibrium price of Y.   
 
Furthermore, the demand for existing houses is not likely to increase as a 
result of the removal of the price control on new houses, even if they are 
substitutes. The reason is that demand can materialize only when it is backed 
by purchasing power. The price control on new apartments allows potential 
homebuyers to purchase dwelling units that are larger than those they could 
afford in the absence of the regulation. Once the price control is removed, 
they can no longer buy the same quantity of housing with the same income. 
In other words, the planned demand under price control will not be fully 
realized in a deregulated setting. Moreover, the increase in new housing 
supply following decontrol will create turnovers of existing dwellings, thereby 
lowering their prices.   
 
Despite all this, most Koreans fear that the removal of the price ceiling would 
raise the prices of existing houses . And that fear was so powerful that it cost 
the post of the Minister of Construction in 1989 after his announcement of a 
plan to decontrol created turmoil. We believe that the fear was real. In fact, we 
later demonstrate that such outcome can occur in the short run due to the 
self-fulfilling expectation, although it is not consistent with the long run 
equilibrium2.  
 
                                                 
2 For an excellent discussion of the role of expectation on the behavior of the stock 
market and the real estate market, see Shiller (1989).   
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The paper consists of four sections. Section 2 describes the mechanics of 
price control and accompanying regulations being enforced in South Korea. 
In section 3, three types of expectation are introduced and applied to examine 
the impact of deregulation. We first consider the perfect foresight and 
adaptive expectation schemes that are often assumed in the economics 
literature. It is demonstrated that housing prices will not rise when the price 
controls on new apartments are lifted under either expectation scheme. We 
then look at the peculiar expectation scheme in which people believe that the 
removal of the price control on new apartments will lead to the increase in 
housing price. It is shown that such expectations are self-fulfilling in the short 
term, i.e. housing prices will rise simply because people believe so. This is an 
example of self-fulfilling expectation even though economic agents are 
misinformed (Kirman 1983, p. 148). But the outcome lasts only for the short 
run since the increase in housing supply following deregulation exerts a 




Mechanics of Price Control and Supplementary Regulations  
 
The price control applies to any new dwelling supplied through residential 
development projects involving twenty units or more in South Korea. It was 
first introduced in 1977 in the form of a uniform price ceiling on all new 
houses. Since 1985, two different ceilings have applied varying with the size 
of dwelling. The controlled price was indexed to the costs of production since 
1989, in order to stimulate housing supply. Despite its general coverage, the 
price control affects only apartments in practice. In the case of single-family 
dwelling and row houses, the developer suffers only a moderate profit loss if 
they opt for a project comprising less than twenty units in order to get around 
the price controls. However, the profit  of the developer declines substantially 
in the case of apartments if the volume of production is reduced below the 
limit of twenty units. Therefore, the developer will not reduce the scale of 
operation in order to escape from the price control. Since the vast majority of 
new housing supply consists of apartments, the price control has far reaching 
implications. 
 
Typically, a price ceiling reduces the quantity supplied of the good on which 
it is imposed (Kim, K. 1997, Kim and Kim 1998). However, a few characteristics 
of the Korean land market need to be considered before one can jump to the 
above general conclusion. The supply of housing is conditioned by the 
availability of developable land. One peculiar feature of the Korean housing 
market is that the supply of residential land is subject to government control. 
The Ministry of Construction and Transport (MOCT) estimates the amount of 
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land needed for residential, commercial, industrial development as well as 
infrastructure projects and then ensures that the 'necessary' amount of land 
be rezoned and developed. The Ministry also approves land use conversion, 
and issues permits for major residential land development projects exclusively 
to public agencies to prevent private developers from collecting large windfall 
profits. Consequently, large-scale land development projects are virtually 
monopolized by the public sector comprising the Korea Land Corporation 
(KLC), the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) and local 
governments (Hannah, Kim and Mills 1993). 
 
There are two reasons that make it difficult to claim that the price control 
reduces the supply of new housing measured in total floor space. Firstly, the 
governmental supply of residential land is determined independently of the 
price ceiling on new houses that are to be built on it . Secondly, the floor-area 
ratios and the land coverage ratios are also strictly controlled. However, 
considering the supplementary regulation on size distribution of new housing 
that is tied to the price control changes the above story. Since the market 
price approaches average production cost and since the average cost 
decreases as the size of the housing unit gets larger, it is natural that the 
market price of housing gets lower, the larger the unit. Interaction between 
the supply and demand will then produce the equilibrium size distribution. If 
the size distribution is somehow distorted by government regulation, then the 
consequent supply of housing will not match the relative intensity of demand 
for dwelling of different sizes. This can be interpreted as a reduction in the 
effective supply of housing although total floor space produced remains the 
same. In fact, that is what the Korean government has done. 
 
When the uniform price ceiling is being enforced, there will be a natural 
tendency towards too many large houses and too few small houses being 
built. This will happen as the interests of the consumers and the producers 
coincide. Consumers prefer larger units because the difference between the 
market price and the regulated price gets larger with the size of the dwelling. It 
is also in the developer's best interest to maximize the share of the large units 
in a development project. This is because the controlled price on the large 
units (exceeding 85 square meters of net floor space) is higher than that on 
the smaller units while the cost of production of an apartment decreases with 
its size. Moreover, the risk of not being able to sell a dwelling unit declines 
with size because the demand for smaller units is weaker than that for larger 
units. The above expected outcome would be unacceptable in light of the 
alleged policy goal of the price control, i.e. making new houses affordable to 
households belonging to the middle income group or below. Therefore, it was 
a natural decision by government to introduce a supplementary regulation on 
the size distribution to go with the price control on new houses. The Korean 
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government has mandated land development projects to allocate at least 70% 
of developed residential sites to houses smaller than 85 square meters in net 
floor space, and 30% to those smaller than 60 square meters.  
 
The combination of the price control and the regulation on size distribution 
led to the supply of new apartments concentrated around a few sizes rather 
than being spread over a continuum. This outcome represents a deviation 
from an equilibrium size distribution because the latter would resemble the 
distribution of income and wealth, which should be much more continuous. 
The fact that larger apartments command a higher price per floor space than 
smaller ones is further evidence of deviation from an unregulated equilibrium. 
The opposite would be true in the free market equilibrium, because the 
average cost of production of apartments decreases with size. As has been 
pointed out earlier, such deviation from equilibrium is equivalent to a 
reduction of new housing supply. In our discussion of the impact of the 
removal of the price control on the supply of new housing in this paper, 
supply refers to effective supply.  
 
 
Expectation and the Impact of Deregulation on Housing Price 
 
The Case of Perfect Foresight 
 
In this section, we analyze the impact of lifting the price control on new 
apartments upon the overall housing prices when economic agents have 
perfect foresight using a stock-adjustment model of Muth (1972). Suppose 
that the demand for housing is a decreasing function of its current price and 
an increasing function of the expected future price, i.e. expected capital gains. 
Letting 
tD  be the demand in period t , tP  be the asset price of housing in time 
t  and ettP 1, +  be the price of housing in 1+t  expected at t , the housing 
demand function can be expressed as 
0),( 1, ³"-+-= + tPPPD t
e
tttt gba        (1) 
where a, b, g are positive constants. Under the assumption of perfect 
foresight, 
11, ++ = t
e
tt PP , and therefore equation (1) can be modified as 
0),( 1 ³"-+-= + tPPPD tttt gba      (1¢) 
The price of housing in period t  tP  is determined at the level at which the 
quantity demanded of housing 
tD  is equated with housing stock tS . Housing 
stock at period t  ( tS ) is equal to sum of the previous period's stock ( 1-tS )  
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and the volume of new production during period 1-t  that can be occupied in 
period t  ( 1-tH )
3. Thus, 
 
11 -- += ttt HSS        (2) 
 
As is done in a typical stock-adjustment model, new housing production is 
assumed to be equal to a fraction (w ) of the gap between the long-run 
equilibrium housing stock ( *S ) and the previous period's housing stock 
(




1 -- -= tt SSH w       (3) 
 
Now suppose that the price of a new apartment is set at P . Then the quantity 
of new housing produced in period 1-t  is determined solely by the regulated 
price regardless of the market price of housing 
1-tP . Since housing production 
increases with the controlled price, the parameter of new housing production 
w  will be an increasing function of P .  That is, 
 
0),( ³¢º www P .     
 
Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) gives a first-order difference 





t +--= w        (4) 
 
0S   refers to the initial housing stock and it is assumed that 
*
0 SS < , because 
no new housing will be produced otherwise.  
 
Assuming that housing market clears in each period, we set equation (1') 
equal to equation (4) to obtain the following first-order difference equation in 





ttt +--=-+- + wgba     (5) 
   
In equation (5), a , b , g , 0S  , 
*S  , w   are all constants.  A trial solution to the 
difference equation can be written as 
                                                 
3 To be precise, housing stock in time t is equal to the sum of housing stock in time t-1 
and new housing production minus demolition during period t-1. One should interpret 
'new housing production' in our paper as the net addition to housing stock. 




t BAP )1( w-+=        (6) 
 





t BAP w , it follows that 
 
tt
tt BBPP )1(]1)1[()1(1 wwww --=---=-+     (7) 
 
Substituting equation (6) and (7) into equation (5) and rearranging the terms, 




tt +--=-+-+- wbawgwb    (8) 
 
Equation (8) implies that *
0)( SSB -=+- gwb  and 
*SA =- ba . Therefore, the 












B  .        (10) 
 
Substituting equations (9) and (10) into equation (6) gives a solution to 















=       (11) 
 
Since 0 < (1- w )<1 , housing price under the assumption of perfect foresight 
is monotone decreasing in time t and converges to the long-run equilibrium 
level ba /)( ** SP -=
4.  
 
Our main concern is about the effect of a change in the controlled price ( P ) 
upon overall price of housing (
tP ). Taking note of the fact that coefficient w  
is an increasing function of P , we differentiate equation (11) with respect to 



























-== -     (12) 
                                                 
4 P* can be found by setting Pt+1 and Pt equal. 
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Since all the constants take positive values and 
0
* SS > , 01 >-w , 0>Pddw , 
it follows that 0<wddPt , i.e. the overall price of housing falls if the 
controlled price on a new apartment is raised. Since lifting the price control 
means that the regulated price can be raised to the level that housing 
producers would choose to set, the deregulation will lead to an increase in the 
production of new housing and hence lower housing prices.  
 
The Case of Adaptive Expectation 
 
This section considers the impact of deregulation of the price control under 
the assumption of adaptive expectation. Economic agents with adaptive 
expectation update their expectations based on the revealed inaccuracy of 
their past expectations. The market price of housing is determined by the 
interaction between demand and supply as before. We also assume that 
housing supply is governed by the same mechanism introduced in the 
previous section.  
 
The only difference from the case of perfect foresight lies in the price 
expectation that affects housing demand. Under perfect foresight, economic 
agents correctly predict future housing price. On the other hand, adaptive 
expectation implies that expected future price ( e
ttP 1, +  ) is a weighted average of 
the past expectation ( e






tt PPP )1(,11, dd -+= -+       (13) 
 
Substituting equation (13) into equation (1), we obtain the housing demand 
equation under adaptive expectation. 
 
e
tttt PPD ,1)( -++-= gdgdba  , 0³"t      (14) 
 
The equilibrium price of housing can be derived by setting housing demand 
given by equation (14) equal to housing supply given by equation (4). The 
















tt PP =- ,1  and ¥=t  in the long-run equilibrium, the equilibrium price is 
equal to ba ** SP -= , which is identical to the one that would prevail under 
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perfect foresight. Housing price converges monotonically to this equilibrium 
price.  
 
It should be noted that the only parameter in equation (15) that is affected by 
the removal of the price control on new apartments is w , the housing supply 
parameter. Decontrol will make w  larger, but it increases the housing stock 
only after one period because it takes time to comp lete new housing. 
Therefore, lifting the price control in period t  will have no immediate impact 
on the market price of housing, and will lower the overall price of housing 
starting in period 1+t  as the volume of new housing production increases 
following decontrol. Therefore, the popular belief that the removal of the price 
control will raise housing prices is not sustained. 
 
The Case of Mixed Expectation 
 
In the discussion above, we showed that the popular belief about the impact 
of the removal of the price control on overall housing prices cannot be 
justified under the assumption of perfect foresight or adaptive expectation. 
According to some surveys, however, a majority of the average citizens and 
some housing experts in Korea believe that decontrol will raise the price of 
existing housing. In this section, we provide an expectation scheme that is 
consistent with the popular belief. It turns out to be the case where 
individuals have adaptive expectation prior to decontrol but convert to a 




We suppose that housing demand function and the expectation scheme prior 










tt PPP )1(,11, dd -+= -+    cttt ¹³" ,0   
 
Where 
ct  denotes the time of decontrol.  
 
Once the price control is lifted, however, market participants change their 
expectation and believe that housing prices will rise in the next period by a 
fraction q  of the difference between the regulated price (P ) and the market 
price 
tP  at the time of decontrol. That is, 
 






tt -+-+= -+ qdd , if ctt =   
 
We assume that the regulated price is always below the equilibrium market 
price, i.e. 
tPP < , 1³"t , and that housing supply mechanism is the same as 
that described in the previous sections5.  
 
In order to analyze the impact of the removal of the price control upon the 
equilibrium price of housing, we need to find out how decontrol affects 
housing demand and supply. Decontrol will increase housing starts, but the 
stock of housing does not increase until the construction of new houses is 
completed after one period. On the other hand, housing demand increases 
immediately with the announcement of decontrol by a fraction qg  of the gap 
between the market price and the controlled price. Since housing stock 
remains unchanged and housing demand increases following the removal of 
the price control on new housing in period t , the price of existing housing 
rises immediately. 
 
However, the rise in housing prices is only a one-time change. The actual 
price of housing in time 1+ct   ( 1+ctP ) must be lower than what was expected in 
period t ( e
tt cc





PP 1,2,1 +++ <  and hence 
housing price starts falling in 2+ct , and the pace accelerates as increased 
housing starts are completed. The housing price path becomes the same as 
that derived in section III starting from 1+ct . The only difference is that the 
initial price level is higher than that considered in the previous section. 
Therefore, the long-run equilibrium price of housing will be the same as 
before, i.e. ba )( *S- .  
 
To summarize, the overall housing price will rise immediately following 
decontrol, but start falling after one period. In fact, the overall housing price 
will fall below the level that would have prevailed had the price control on 
new houses been maintained, before it converges to the long-run equilibrium 
level that is identical to what would prevail under perfect foresight.  
 
A Numerical Example 
 
In this subsection, we present a simulation exercise about the impact of 
decontrol on the housing price path. In fact, such exercise is not necessary 
because we have already demonstrated the outcome using an analytic model. 
                                                 
5 One should be reminded that the regulated price applies only to new houses whereas the 
equilibrium price refers to the overall housing price.  
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Instead, the simulation is done to visualize the impact of lifting the price 
control to those who find it difficult to believe it.  
 
The model we use for simulation is essentially the same as that presented in 
the previous section. The difference is that the housing supply equation was 
modified to highlight the fact that deregulation of the price control makes new 
housing supply more sensitive to housing shortages. The modified model is 
given by 
 





SSH -= w , if ctt <    
)( * tt SSH -= w , if ctt ³     
 
Since 
tPP <  by assumption, ww <)( tPP . 
 
To calibrate the model, we need to assign values of the parameters. However, 
the choice of parameter values is not crucial because our analytic result holds 
regardless of the parameter values. For the sake of illustration, the following 

























We consider three values for w  in order to see how the housing price trend 
is affected by the responsiveness of housing supply. We assume that the 
controlled price ( P ) is 150 and the price control is lifted in period 4, i.e. 4=ct . 
Therefore, the controlled prices in period 1 through period 3 are 150 and it 
collapses to the market equilibrium price in period 4. We further assume that 
the housing price that is expected in period 0 to prevail in period 1 is 250. The 
size of the housing stock in period 1 is set at 100. 
 
Simulation results are illustrated in figure 1, 2 and 3. In each figure, the curve 
labeled with  denotes the housing price path with the continuation of the 
price control, that labeled with  indicates the price path when the price 
control is lifted and market participants have adaptive expectation, and that 
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labeled with  refers to the housing price path following decontrol when 
market participants have adaptive expectation. Figure 1,2 and 3 are drawn for 
the three different values for w , namely, 0.01, 0.04, 0.1, respectively.  
We can now examine the impact of decontrol using figure 1. If the price 
control is maintained, the housing price is seen to fall over time from 243 in 
period 1 to 234 in period 20. Now suppose that the price control is lifted in 
period 4. If people have a adaptive expectation, the housing price jumps to 
285 immediately following decontrol. Their expectations are self-fulfilling in 
that housing price rises just because people expect it to do so. Even in this 
case, however, housing price starts falling in period 5. And by period 12, 
housing price falls below the level that would prevail if the price control were 
maintained. And the gap expands as the housing stock increases with the 
completion of new houses that were started at the announcement of 
decontrol. The gap closes as the housing stock approaches the long run 
equilibrium level at 300. 
 
Figure 1:  Expectation & Housing Price Path Following Decontrol  















It is interesting to compare the above outcome with that under the 
assumption of adaptive expectation. When market participants have adaptive 
expectation, the housing price remains unchanged as the price control is lifted 
in period 4. This is because the housing demand is not affected since housing 
price expectation is backward-looking and housing stock remains unchanged 
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until new housing construction is completed one period later. Thus housing 
price starts falling in period 5 as the housing stock increases. In short, 
housing price does not rise with decontrol if people have adaptive 
expectation, as we have demonstrated using our analytic model in section 3.  
Figure 2: Expectation & Housing Price Path Following Decontrol  
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Figure 3:  Expectation & Housing Price Path Following Decontrol  
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  decontrol-adaptive expectation
  decontrol-mixed expectation
 
 
Another point to notice is that the two price paths that prevail under the two 
different expectation schemes converge within a reasonably short period of 
time. This happens because the mixed expectation reverts to adaptive 
expectation after the price control is lifted. Eventually these two price paths 
as well as that under the price control all collapse to the same long-run 
equilibrium path.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 reveal a similar pattern. One noticeable difference compared 
with figure 1 is that the housing price path following decontrol crosses the 
path that would prevail under the continuation of the price control earlier than 
in figure 1. In figure 1, the intersection of the two paths took place in period 
12, whereas it takes place in period 10 and period 9, respectively, in figures 2 
and 3. This happens because housing stock increases by a larger amount 
following decontrol if the supply of new housing is more responsive.  
  
In summary, the simulation exercise has confirmed the following propositions 
that have already been proven using an analytic model.  
 
(i) Under the assumption of adaptive expectation, housing price is 
unaffected by the removal of the price control for some time. And 
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housing price starts falling as the increased housing starts are 
completed and the stock of housing expands accordingly. 
 
(ii) When people have a mixed expectation of the form we considered in 
section IV, housing price does rise immediately at the announcement of 
decontrol. Nevertheless, the price increase lasts for only one period and 
eventually housing price falls below the level that would have prevailed 
had the price control continued. 
 
(iii) The magnitude of the drop in housing price following decontrol is the 





The price control on new apartments and other regulations that go with it 
have distorted the Korean housing market in many respects over the past two 
decades.  The policy was also inequitable because it benefited mainly middle 
and high-income groups, and definitely not low-income households (Kim 
1997). Despite these criticisms on efficiency and equity grounds, the price 
control has been maintained for political reasons (Kim and Kim 1998). One key 
element of the political aspect of the price control is the popular belief that 
decontrol will raise the price of existing housing.  
 
In this paper, we demonstrated that such belief can be justified only under a 
peculiar type of expectation, and that, even under such circumstances, the 
price increase lasts for only a short while. We do not know the exact 
expectation mechanism that governs the actual behavior of most participants 
in the Korean housing market. But if housing price ever proves to rise 
following decontrol, it must be a result of self-fulfilling expectation. More 
importantly, housing price will soon fall below the level that would prevail if 
the price control were maintained. 
 
If we can change the expectation mechanism held by the majority of the 
market participants, we will be able to avoid the temporary increase in the 
price of existing housing stock following the removal of the price control. 
Housing experts and the mass media can make a valuable contribution to this 
process by helping rectifying market participants rectify the self-fulfilling 
expectation they have.  
 
Finally, the supply of new housing needs to be made more elastic in order to 
maximize the positive impact of decontrol. This can be done by increasing the 
supply of developable land through relaxation of land use control.   
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